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DISSENTING STOCKHOLDERS AND AMENDMENTS TO
CORPORATE CHARTERS
INTRODUCTION.

Few branches of corporation law are in a more confused and
unsatisfactory state than that relating to the right of minority
stockholders to prevent amendments to the corporate charter,
to which they have not given their assent, from becoming operative. The problem arises under three distinct types of charters
which differ so widely from one another that they must be dealt
with separately. There is in the first place the type of charter,
once common, but rare, if not wholly unknown today, which is
granted without any provision for amendment being made at
the time either in the charter itself or in the general law. Secondly, there is the charter which is granted subject to a power
of amendment or repeal reserved by the legislature. Lastly,
there is the corporate charter which is granted subject to corporation laws which not only reserve to the legislature the power
of amendment or repeal but confer an amending power upon the
majority stockholders as well.- Each of these types of charter
presents difficult problems with regard to the rights of dissenting minority stockholders.
'Theoretically a charter might be granted which conferred an amending
power on the majority but reserved no such power to the legislature, but no
modern legislature would be likely to grant such a charter.
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MINORITY'S RIGHTS UNDER UNAMENDABLE CHARTERS.

Owing to constitutional restrictions existing in many States
forbidding the granting of unamendable charters, 2 and also to
a policy against the granting of such charters which has come
to control the actions of legislatures in States where no such
constitutional restrictions exist, the unamendable ;charter has
become almost extinct. An understanding of the rights which
it confers upon the individual stockholder is, however, the
necessary basis for any intelligent discussion of the rights of
such stockholder under the other types of charters.
Whatever one's views may be as to the substantial or insubstantial character of the distinctions between a business corporation and a partnership, it is universally recognized that the
charter or articles of organization of a corporation form, like
the articles of a partnership, a contract between the members.
In the case of a partnership, it is no less plain that the articles,
being thus a contract between each member of the firm and every
3
other member, cannot be amended without unanimous consent.
In the case of a corporation, the problem is complicated by the
fact that, owing to our conception of the charter as a grant of
authority by the state, the charter cannot be amended even by
unanimous consent without the state's permission. 4 Assuming
however, that the state gives such permission, may that permission be taken advantage of by a majority of the stockholders
or must acceptance of the amendment be unanimous?
In view of the doctrine that the charter is a contract between each stockholder and every other stockholder and in view
of the constitutional protection of contracts against impairments
by state legislation, it would seem at first sight that the answer
must necessarily be that unanimous acceptance of the amendment is necessary, and this without regard to the question of the
'See 7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1919) §4300 for a list of
such constitutional provisions.
'Natusch v. Irving, 2 Coop. temp. Cott. 358 (Eng. 1824); Gow, PARTNERSHIP (3rd ed. 1841) Appendix VI, p. 398.
4I
MoRAwEz, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 395. It is difficult
to find explicit authority for this proposition, which is, however, a necessary
consequence of the accepted theory that incorporation is a legislative grant.
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interpretation of the legislative intent as indicated by the statute
conferring the permission to amend; for if that statute, properly interpreted, purports to confer the amending power on less
than all of the stockholders, it would seem to be unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of the contract between the
stockholders. Nevertheless, an examination of the authorities
reveals that, although unanimous consent is ordinarily necessary, 5 the rule requiring it is, in most jurisdictions at least, subject to an important qualification.
That qualification is due to the doctrine that a change authorized to be made in a charter contract is not an impairment
thereof with regard to dissenting. stockholders, provided the
alteration can be characterized by some such criticism-disarming
adjective as auxiliary, incidental, or non-fundamental. 6 The
basis for the general rule that changes in the charter cannot be
made without unanimous consent being that the charter is a
contract between the members analogous to the articles of a
partnership, it is difficult to find a logical justification for permitting even minor alterations of this contract without the consent of all parties thereto.
It may, indeed, be urged that such of the provisions of the
'Middlesex Turnpike Co. v. Luke, 8 Mass. 267 (81i); Union Locks
and Canals v. Towne, i N. H. 44 (1817); Hartford & New Haven R. R.
v. Crosswell, 5 Hill 383 (N. Y. 1843); Stevens v. Rutland & B. R. Co.,
The rule is also recognized in the more recent cases but
29 Vt. 545 (85).
the actual results in these cases are affected by the fact that they generally
deal with charters granted subject to a power of amendment reserved by
the legislature.
'Banet v. Alton & Sangamon R. R., 13 Ill. 504 (i85i), change "beneficial to corporation" and not "radical"; Kenosha v. Rockport, etc. R. Co., 17
Wis. 13 (1863), change "in furtherance of the original undertaking and incidental to it"; Woodfork v. Union Bank, 3 Cold. 488, 500 (Tenn. r866),
"auxiliary and not fundamental"; Mower v. Staples, 32 Minn. 284, 2o N. W.
225 (1884), "auxiliary." The rule was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Clearwater v. Meredith, I Wall. 25 (1864), in which the
court said: "But it is not every minute and unimportant change which
would work a dissolution of the contract." See also Nugent v. Supervisors of Putnam County, ig Wall. 241 (1873). The rule is frequently
referred to in the more recent cases, but nearly all of these relate to corporations whose charters are subject to a legislative power of amendment, and
it is generally difficult to deternnie to what extent the court has been influenced
by that fact in its phrasing and application of the rule. There are a few
cases taking the position that no change is valid without unanimous consent.
See Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc. R. R., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, 189 (1867). See
also i MoAvErz, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 403.
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charter as were inserted wholly at the instance of the state and
for the protection of the interests of persons other than the
incorporators do not form part of the latter's contract inter se,
and hence that their alteration does not involve any alteration of
that contract. 7 Some of the cases dealing with so-called auxiliary
amendments may be supported on this ground. Where, for example, a charter of a railroad or turnpike company provides that
it is to be forfeited unless the road is constructed by a certain
date, it may fairly be said that the amendment extending the
time is simply a waiver of the state's right of forfeiture and does
not modify the contract between the stockholders." So, too, if
restrictions on the power of a public service company to mortgage its property are plainly imposed for the benefit of the publc at large rather than for the protection of the stockholders,
an amendment removing these restrictions may properly be said
Even
not to involve a change in the stockholders' contract.'
where the amendment, instead of removing restrictions, grants
additional powers which are merely new means of carrying out
the purposes for which the corporation is organized, it is doubtless true in many cases that the change involves no real alteration
of the original intent. It may well be that although the incorporators have, perhaps as a result of legislative insistence on
definiteness, prescribed in their charter a particular means for
accomplishing their purpose which seemed at that time to be
satisfactory, their real underlying purpose was to reach the desired end by such methods as experience should from time to
time demonstrate to be practicable.
Nevertheless, it is easy to carry this line of reasoning too
far, if what we are seeking is the intent of the incorporators.
Where their contract in terms provides for a particula" method
of carrying out the enterprise proposed, and where there is nothSee MORAWETZ, op. Cit. § 400.
'Taggart v. Western Maryland R. R., 24 Md. 563 (i866); Milford &
Chillicothe Turnpike Co. v. Brush, IO Ohio 111 (1840). Some of the decisions
commonly cited for this proposition are based on the existence of the reserved
power to amend. See, for example, Agricultural Branch R. R. v. Winchester,
13 Allen 29 (Mass. i866).
'Joy v. Jackson, etc. Plank Road Co., ii Mich. 155 (1863).
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ing to indicate that the limitation as to method was imposed on
them by the legislature, there'is a real possibility that some of
them at least regarded the means selected as important and had
no intention to permit them to be altered. The statement sometimes made by courts that there is an implied agreement on the
part of each stockholder to permit the majority to accept amendments -which the law regards as auxiliary or incidental to the
original plan is manifestly false, if by implied agreement we
mean an agreement implied in fact and based on the intention of
the contracting parties as manifested by the language which
they have used. The rule of majority control within the original agreement is not a peculiar rule of corporation law but, today at any rate, applies to partnerships as well, 10 and yet it would
astonish the bar to be told that one who signs articles of partnership impliedly agrees that the majority of his associates may
amend without his consent provided that the amendments are
not fundamental in character.
It is plain, therefore, that when we speak of an implied
agreement by the minority in the case of corporations to consent
to minor changes, we are not speaking of an agreement implied
in fact at all but rather of an agreement implied in law, or, in
plainer language, of a rule of law devised by the courts in the
interests of justice as they see it and imposed on objecting stockholders irrespective of their actual intent. The language of the
majority of the cases indicates that there is such a rule, and the
results reached in them are difficult to explain unless the existence of such a rule is conceded.
It is submitted that the rule is a desirable one. Granting
that a charter is a contract between the stockholders and therefore possesses some similarity to articles of partnership, the
differences between the factual situation presented by the articles
of ordinary partnership and that presented by the articles of
the ordinary corporation are substantial. The normal partnership is composed of a small group of persons and the partnership articles are in a real, and not merely in a theoretical sense,
" BURDICK, PARTNERSHIP

(3rd ed. 1917)

228.
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the terms on which they have agreed to do business together.
The normal corporation is a much larger group and owing to
the transferability of its stock its articles are not as a general
rule the language of those who ultimately become the owners of
the enterprise. In many of the cases in which a minority stockholder seeks to block a change in the method of doing business
on the ground that it involves a change in his contract which
cannot lawfully be made without his consent, it is probable, if
not certain, that the objecting stockholder joined the enterprise
with only the vaguest notions as to its scope and with no idea
whatever as to whether the comparatively slight change in its
business policy to which he now objects could or could not be
accomplished under the articles in their original form. Under
such circumstances, his insistence on blocking small amendments
furnishes ground for the suspicion that his real object is not to
keep the enterprise in the ancient grooves but to force the majority to buy him out at an extravagant figure.
Like many another rule of law, the rule that has curbed
to some extent the power of the dissenter to act the part of
blackmailer has been phrased in the language of fiction, but to
demonstrate the unreality of fiction is not by any means to
demonstrate the unwisdom of the rule, which, if confined within proper limits, seems better calculated to promote business
needs and to do justice between majority and minority than a
rule giving the latter an unqualified veto power would do.
It is submitted, however, that inasmuch as the rule grants
the
majority in the interests of fairness and of progress a
to
power which there is no evidence that the minority intended to
confer on them, it ought to be confined within rather narrow
limits. It may be justifiable to allow the majority to accept changes in name," slight changes in routing of rail13
roads, 2 or changes in the number of directors to be chosen.
It would seem, however, that some of the cases permitting modi' Clark v. Monongahela Navigation Co., 1o Watts 364 (Pa. 1840).
"Milford & Chillicothe Turnpike Co. v. Brush, supra note 8; Wilson v.
Wills Valley R. R., 33 Ga. 466 (863).
"Mower v. Staples, supra note 6.
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fication of routes have gone rather far, 14 and that the occasional
decisions sanctioning consolidations by majority vote, 15 the result of which is that one who has subscribed to stock in the A
corporation finds himself without his consent a stockholder in
the B corporation, carry the doctrine to unjustifiable lengths.
It may, however, fairly be said that most of the courts which
have adopted this doctrine have applied it in conservative fashion.
Although it is generally accepted as law today, its practical importance is a matter on which considerable difference of opinion
may well exist, for, as we shall see, it is not wholly clear how
far recent decisions on majority control are due to it and how
far to another doctrine with which we shall shortly have to
deal.
So much for the legal situation with regard to state corporations with unamendable charters. The case of a federal corporation with a charter purporting to be unamendable would
present an interesting problem inasmuch as Congress is not expressly restrained from impairing contracts but only from depriving persons of property without due process of law. How
far a federal charter not expressly made amendable would create
in a stockholder vested property rights which could not be altered
without his consent is a problem on which the opinions of the
courts shed very little light, since in the few cases which have
arisen involving federal corporations the charter has contained
a clause expressly permitting Congress to amend it. The ques"1Thus the Illinois courts have treated rather substantial changes in rail-

road routes as non-fundamental within the meaning of this rule. Banet v.
Alton & Sangamon R. R., supra note 6; Peoria & Oquawka R. R. v. Elting, 17
11.

(1856) ; Rice v. Rock Island & Alton R. R., 21 Ill. 93 (i859).
" Hanna v. C. & F. W. R. R., 20 Ind. 3o (1863). This case is difficult
to reconcile with other Indiana cases, although it purports to be based on
special facts. See McCray v. Junction R. R., 9 Ind. 358 (1857) ; Shelbyville
& R. Turnpike Co. v. Barnes, 42 Ind. 498 (1873). The case of Sprague v.
Illinois River R. R., i9 Ill. 173 (1857), sometimes cited as supporting consolidations by majority vote, seems to relate to a different matter. The amendment authorized the company to abandon part of its projected line and consolidate and connect with another railroad. The connection and abandonment
had taken place but apparently the consolidation had not. The weight of
authority is to the effect that consolidation is a fundamental change. Clearwater v. Meredith, I Wall. 25 (1863) ; New Orleans J. & G. N. R. R. v. Harris,
27 Miss. 517 (1854); Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R., 3o Pa. 42 (1858).
429
5
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tion of federal charters will, accordingly, be left for treatment
in a later portion of this article in connection with state charters
granted subject to a reserved power to amend.
THE

RESERVED POWER-RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION AND OF

THE STOCKHOLDERS AS A WHOLE.

State charters containing a reservation to the state of the
power to amend or repeal were occasionally granted at a very
early period. 1 6 Their general vogue, however, is a result of the
famous Dartmouth College case,' 7 and any attempt to determine
their meaning and effect must, therefore, start with a discussion
of that case.
That case arose out of the attempt on the part of the legislature of New Hampshire to make radical changes in the charter
of Dartmouth College, an eleemosynary educational corporation chartered by the King of England in the days when New
Hampshire was a British colony. The validity of the act providing for these changes was attacked by the trustees of the
College, on the ground that the charter was a contract the obligation of which was unconstitutionally impaired by the statute.
Since the corporation was a charitable and not a business
enterprise, the doctrine formerly referred to, that a charter is
based upon a contract between the members, similar to the articles of a partnership, was not applicable. It might, nevertheless,
have been possible to treat the charter as embodying a contract
between the donors inter se or between the donor and the trustees. It was not, however, on any such theory that the case was
argued and decided. The United States Supreme Court had
previously held that the constitutional clause protects executed
as well as executory contracts and that a legislative grant of
'See Commonwealth v. Bonsall, 3 Wharton 559 (Pa. 1838), dealing
with a charter granted in 1784; Houston v. Jefferson College, 63 Pa. 428
(1869), dealing with a charter granted in i8o2. The earliest judicial intimation that such a reservation would be effectual to enlarge the power of the
legislature over corporations is found in Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143 (8o6).
1
'Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 712 (1819). In his
concurring opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Story said that "if the legislature
mean to claim such an authority" (to amend the charter) "it must be reserved
in the grant."
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land is therefore within its scope.1 8 Adopting this principle as
a premise, Webster's famous argument drew from it the conclusion that the royal charter was a grant from the King to the
founder of the College, and hence a contract between the former
and the latter.19 The force of this argument in so far as it applied to the problem of private corporations seems to have been
admitted by counsel for the state, who contended that Dartmouth
College was an institution founded for public rather than private
ends and that the charter of such an institution is not a contract
but an ordinary legislative act.20 Webster's argument was accepted by the court, with the result that the decision established
the doctrine that a corporate charter is a contract between the
state and the corporation or the incorporators and that this contract is protected by the constitution from impairment by subsequent legislation.
While the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case to the
effect that the corporate charter is a contract with the state has,
as the Supreme Court said in a later case, "become firmly established as a canon of American jurisprudence," 21 it has not
escaped criticism. Whatever may be said in support of it as an
early nineteenth century exposition of the meaning of the word
"contract" in an eighteenth century constitution, 22 it is not altogether in harmony with modern conceptions of contracts, of corporations, or of the proper scope of legislative power.
The doctrine of the case is a two-fold one: that a legislative grant is a contract, and that a charter is a legislative grant.
Each aspect of the doctrine is open to criticism from the standpoint of present day legal theories. Whatever the usage may
have been in Marshall's day, we do not now speak of a fully
'Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (i81o).
'See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note i7, pp. s89 et seq.
See ibid. pp. 6o8 et seq.
Brown, J., in Pearsall v. Gt. Northern Ry., I61 U. S. 646, 66o (1896).
'Blackstone defines contracts as including "a contract executed which
differs in nothing from a grant," 2 BL. CoMM.* 443. Both Alexander Hamilton and Robert G. Harper had, prior to the decision in Fletcher v. Peck, supra
note i8, given opinions to the effect that the contract clause forbade a state
to revoke its grant. I WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTORY (19U) 397. But see the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson in that case.
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executed grant, unaccompanied by warranties or other promises
of either party, as a contract, nor of the obligation of a grantor
not to attempt to repossess himself of the thing granted as contractual.
The assumption that a charter is a legislative grant is not
so clearly inconsistent with current modes of legal thinking as
is the idea that the grant is a contract. This notion of the charter
as a grant, which long antedates Marshall,2 3 has become so deeply
embodied in our law by the Dartmouth College 24 case and by
subsequent cases, that it is probably true that most lawyers even
today accept it without question. Nevertheless, many of our most
acute judges and legal writers are today extremely critical of the
notion.

25

As long as incorporation was a special privilege granted as
an act of legislative grace to certain persons and denied to others,
the conception of a charter as a grant or franchise was a natural
one. Today, however, our statutes generally provide that the
privilege of incorporation for business purposes is open to all,
and in many states special favors granted to some corporations
only are forbidden by the state constitution. Unless we insist
on attaching a large measure of importance to the convenient
fiction of corporate personality, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that the right to be a corporation is no more a grant or
franchise than is the right to do any of the other things, such
as drive an automobile or locomotive, keep a dog, become a
limited partner, practice law or medicine, or make a will, which
are today permitted only on compliance with certain statutory
requirements. According to this view, our corporation laws are
"The legal habit of thinking of a corporation as a grant, concession, or
franchise dates back to the middle ages, having its roots both in the common
law and in the canonist's view of the corporation as a fictitious person created
by an act of sovereign power. See HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE COIIION
LAW (ist ed.) 373.

"Supra note 17.
'Whether we like it or no, the concession theory has notice to quit and
may carry the whole fiction theory with it. MAITLAND, INTRODUCTION TO
GIERE's POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES

(1900)

XXXVIII. "We

may assume further, in accordance with a favorite speculation of these days,

that philosophically a partnership and a corporation illustrate a single principle"; Holmes J., in Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Wehrmann, 202 U. S. 295, 300

(i9o6).

AMENDMENTS TO CORPORATE CHARTERS

simply regulations of a certain mode of. doing business, and
our so-called charters, apart from their aspect as contracts between the incorporators, are simply evidence that the incorporators have complied with the legislative requirements and hence
are entitled .to do business in that mode. On this theory the repeal or amendment of a charter is merely a change in the law,
and the only problems which it raises are whether it-amounts to
a denial of due process in that it deprives some one of property rights which ought in fairness to be regarded as vested, or
whether it impairs the obligation of the contract existing between
the members of the corporation.
Of course the Dartmouth College case 26 and its successors
make it impossible for us to treat the problem of corporate
charters altogether from this standpoint. But those of us,
whether judges or students of the law, who regard it as the
most satisfactory method of viewing the problem of legislative
control over corporations find it difficult not to be influenced by
it in our attitude toward phases of the problem which are sufficiently removed from the question raised by the Dartmouth
College case; 7 so that their solution is not foreclosed by that
decision.
At least one elaborate and well reasoned attempt has been
made to view the problem of reserved power to amend and repeal
from this angle, namely, that of Chief Justice Doe of New,
Hampshire. In his opinion of the well known case of Dow v.
Northern R. R.,28 and in his notes prepared in connection with
that case, which are contained in the sixth volume of the Harvard Law Review, 29 Judge Doe contends that the Dartmouth
College case so is erroneous in that it treats a corporate charter
as a contract instead of as an exercise of legislative power, and
that the effect of a reservation of power to amend or repeal is
not to modify the charter contract but to get away from the con'Supra note 17.
2Ibid.
'67 N. H. I, 36 Atl. 5Io (887).
A New View of the Dartmouth College Case, 6 Harv. L. Rev. i61 (1893).
2
Supra note 17.
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tract theory altogether, and thus to restore the situation which
would have existed had the Dartmouth College case "' been de32
cided the other way.

What, then, is this legislative power which is retained by
the insertion in the charter of an amendment or repeal clause?
It is such power of regulation by law as the legislature would
have over the business enterprise if it were unincorporated, and
in addition the power to repeal the privilege, which exists only by
legislation, of doing business in the corporate form. This power
of repeal includes in it the power to repeal conditionally instead
of absolutely, thus affording the stockholders the alternative of
getting out of business or accepting the modified charter. In
that case, however, the modified charter can be accepted only by
unanimous consent, for acceptance involves an alteration of the
only true contract which exists, the contract of the stockholders
inter se. Legislative power does not include the power to modify
contracts.
On this view the power to amend would appear to mean
only the power conditionally to repeal, unless-and Judge Doe
uIbid.
= A similar view of the effect of the reserved power has occasionally
been expressed by other judges. "It (the reservation) places the corporation
in the same position it would have been in had the Supreme Court held that
charters are not contracts"; Field, J., in San Mateo County v. Southern Pac.
This view was reiterated by Judge Field in
R. R., 13 Fed. 722, 755 (1882).
his dissenting opinion in Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, no U. S.
347, 371 (1883). The same view of the matter is expressed in 2 CooK, CoR§ 5O1, and Mr. Cook's language has been quoted
PoRATIoNs (8th ed. 1923)
and approved by the Utah court. Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497,
91 Pac. 369

(19o7).

On the other hand, the author of a learned article in this Review, although arguing at length in favor of Judge Field's position, admitted that
the majority of the cases decided prior to i9o5, the date of that article, were
not in accord with it; Horace Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State
Under the Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation,
53 U. OF PA. L. REv. I, 27 (i9O5). In the light of subsequent cases, such as Polk
v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass'n. of N. Y., 207 U. S. 310 (1907), it is even
clearer today that Judge Field's proposition is not law in the majority of
jurisdictions. If the Dartmouth College case had been decided the other way
and if the legislatures had consequently regarded it as unnecessary to reserve
power to amend charters, the courts would hardly have avoided holding that
the legislature, although possessing power to repeal charters conditionally or
unconditionally and to legislate with regard to corporations for purposes falling
within the police power, would have had no power to amend charters. Nevertheless, the majority of the courts insist that the legislature does possess such
a power.
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is-not explicit on this point, which was not involved in the case
of Dow v. Northern R. R.3 -- there is power to repeal a portion
of the corporate privileges without thereby conferring on the
minority the right to insist on a dissolution. It would seem that
if such power of partial repeal does exist, it must, according to
this theory, be confined within narrow limits, as the repeal of
any substantial part of the corporate privileges would make the
enterprise substantially different from that originally contemplated, and hence modify the contract between the stockholders.
The problem, according to Judge Doe's reasoning, would seem
to be identical with the problem whether a law which makes it
illegal to carry on a substantial portion of the business hitherto
conducted by a partnership dissolves the partnership.
Apart from this question of partial repeal, the effect of
Judge Doe's view is thus to limit the regulation of corporate
affairs, even under charters containing the reserved power, .to
regulations which would be constitutional if imposed on" partnerships and to regulations imposed indirectly by the rather
clumsy device of threatening to repeal the charter unless the
regulations be accepted, 3 4 and also regulations in the form of
such incidental and beneficial changes in the charter as may be
authorized under the doctrine of implied consent previously set
forth."5
If the question could fairly be regarded as an open one, the
writer would be tempted to adopt Judge Doe's solution of the
problem. .It gets rid for practical purposes-since substantially
all charters now existing are subject to amendment--of the
rather archaic reasoning of the Dartmouth College case 38 and
gives us a theory as to the scope of the reserved power which is
intelligible and should be comparatively easy to apply. Recent
cases have demonstrated that the contract clause does not prevent the legislature from modifying contracts under its police
'Supra note 28.
" Such regulations can, according to this view, be accepted only by unanimous consent. If one stockholder dissents, the others must induce him to sell
his stock or dissolve.
"Judge Doe does not accept this latter doctrine, except in a modified
form. See Dow v. Northern Railroad, supra note 28 at 522.
"Supra note 17.
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power when sufficient reasons for so doing exist,3

7

and it may be

argued that the police power plus the power of repeal and the
power to deal with obstructive minority stockholders on the
basis of the theory of implied consent to incidental changes give
the legislature all the power which public policy requires. 3 8
Nevertheless, an examination of the cases, and especially of
those in the United States Supreme Court, 39 makes it abundantly
clear that Judge Doe's theory has not prevailed in most jurisdictions. It would be surprising indeed if it had. In the first place
the theory involves the repudiation of the reasoning of the Dartmouth College case 40 to an extent which could hardly be ex'The most striking illustrations of the extent to which contracts may be
modified under the police power are the New York rent law cases. Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921); Levy Leasing Co.
v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 243 (1922). It has, of course, long been unquestionable
that a state cannot contract away its police power, but it does not necessarily
follow that private contracts may be modified under the police power, a
proposition which was not definitely established until the decision in Manigault
v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473 (9o5).
"A
liberal interpretation of the police power would have made the reserved power to amend charters unnecessary for the purpose of enabling the
legislature to protect the rights of outsiders. The rule giving the minority the
right to prevent the majority from accepting substantial amendments does,
however, frequently work injustice in that it may compel the majority to pay
an eiorbitant price for the right to make changes which are plainly beneficial. This difficulty would not have been a serious one had the early corporation statutes contained a provision authorizing the majority to amend. Where,
however, as was generally the case until recently, the corporation laws gave
the majority no such power, it may fairly be contended that Judge Doe's
views, even if modified by the doctrine that the majority may adopt amendments which are "auxiliary" or "incidental" would, unless a very liberal construction had been given to these words, have left a dangerous power of
obstruction in the hands of the minority.
'See, for example, Miller v. New York, I5 Wall. 478 (1873), change
in voting rights of stockholders held valid; Close v. Greenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 465 (1883), amendment of charter of cemetery to give lot
owners control held valid (the corporation was chartered by Congress and
not by state legislature, but the decision is not rested on that ground) ; Looker
v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46 (19oo),

amendment permitting cumulative voting

held valid; Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass'n. of New York, supra
note 32, law authorizing directors to make radical change in kind of insurance
policy to be issued by mutual company held valid. For state cases upholding
substantial amendments, see Coox, loc. cit. supra note 32. Such of these cases
as hold the amendment to be valid as against objecting stockholders are
plainly inconsistent with Judge Doe's views. Some of the others, where the
objection was made by the corporation, might be reconciled with Judge Doe's
theory by treating the amendment as a conditional repeal and the failure of
the corporation to dissolve as an acceptance of the condition. See, however,
note 46 infra, with regard to the difficulties involved in such an interpretation
of the cases.
'OSupra note 17.
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pected to find favor with the courts in view of the fame of that
opinion and of its author and of the numerous occasions on
which it had been cited with approval during the period which
intervened between that decision and the case of Dow v. Northern R. R. 41 In the second place, Judge Doe's theory gives so
little scope to the word "amend" as distinguished from the
word "repeal" that it is not altogether satisfactory as an interpretation of the intent of the legislature in reserving the amending as well as the repealing power. Furthermore, the doctrine
that contracts may be amended under the police power is a very
recent one,42 and until this doctrine became established, the tendency to treat the amending power as the basis for justifying
the sort of regulation of corporations which was generally conceded to be desirable was almost unavoidable.
It is clear, not only from the language used in many cases
but from the results which they reach, that Judge Doe's treatment of the reserved power as a kind of legislative recall of the
decision in the Dartmouth College case 43 will not do, and that
we must, in discussing the reserved power, accept the correctness of Marshall's proposition that a corporate charter is, for
constitutional purposes, a contract between the incorporators and
the state as well as a contract between the incorporators
44

inter se.

"Ibid.
See note 37, supra.
"Supra note 17.
"It is sometimes said that a corporate charter includes three contracts,
one between the state and the corporation, one between the state and the
stockholders, and one between the stockholders inter se. Coox, op. cit. supra
note 32, § 492. There is no doubt that an amendment to a charter may produce
any one of three different effects: it may affect the corporation and it alone;
it may affect all the stockholders equally -as in the case of amendments imposing an additional stockholders' liability to creditors; it may modify the
relative rights of the stockholders. It is difficult, however, to regard the
charter as being at once the instrument which brings the corporation into
existence and a contract with it. If we must look upon the transaction as a
contract with the state, it would seem that the only contract which the state
makes is made with the incorporators as individuals and their successors. The
effect of this contract is, however, to confer upon them both individual rights
as members of the corporation and collective rights, which are treated in the
law as the rights of the corporation as a legal entity. Where subsequent legislation impairs rights of the latter sort, the right to complain of such impairment is treated as a corporate right; where it impairs rights of the former
sort, the right to complain is a right of the members as individuals.
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What, then, of a charter granted subject to the reserved
power of amendment or repeal? Even if an ordinary grant or
charter is a contract, it might seem that a repealable grant or
charter is not; for the obligation, which Marshall called contractual, not to derogate from one's grant does not exist where
the grantor expressly states that his grant is revocable or modifiable. Accordingly, one's natural impulse is to say that a repealable charter cannot be a contract, and that the legislative
power which exists over it exists not because the incorporators
have consented to the exercise of the repealing power, but because they have no option in the matter. The power of an owner
of property to revoke a license is not based on the theory that
a license is a contract and that the licensee has consented to
revocation, but on the right of an owner to do what he wills
with his own. It would seem that a revocable charter is a mere
license, and that the reserved power clause is simply a statement
by the state as licensor that it is not contracting that its bounty
may at any time be revoked or cut down.
Although this reasoning does not, like that of Judge Doe,
involve any criticism of the Dartmouth College case, the result
which it reaches with respect to the power of the legislature is
exactly the same as that reached by Judge Doe. If it were not
for the reserved power, there would be two contracts, that between the state and corporation, and that between stockholder
and stockholders; and the legislature could impair neither. The
reserved power, according to this theory, prevents the first contract from coming into existence; it cannot affect the second as
the legislature has no constitutional power to do this, except in
so far as the legislature may affect contracts under the police
power.
If, then, we adopt this view, we must, as under Judge Doe's
view, explain the cases upholding amendments as against objection by the corporation on the ground that the legislature in
amending the charter is, in effect, saying to the corporation,
"accept the amendment or dissolve," and that the corporation, by
failing to dissolve, has necessarily accepted despite any protest
'

Supra note 17.
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it may making. It may indeed be possible to explain the cases
on this basis, but any such explanation is certainly wholly out
of accord with the language of the decisions. 46
As for the cases upholding amendments as against objection
by minority stockholders, it would seem that this view does not,
like that of Judge Doe, necessarily require us to disapprove of
those cases., It is true that this view, no less than that of Judge
Doe, involves the proposition that-the legislature is wholly without power to change the contract between the stockholders. It
does not, however, necessarily involve the proposition that the
majority stockholders are without power to do this. If, as Judge
Doe maintains, the reserved power, as between state and corporation, simply wipes out the effect of an erroneous judicial
decision, there would seem to be no reason for giving it any
additional effect as between stockholder and stockholders. If,
on the other hand, the reserved power does give the legislature
the power, which it would not otherwise possess, of confronting
the corporation with the alternative of dissolving or accepting an
amendment, it may be possible to argue that, in joining a corporation whose existence is subject to such a power, a stockholder confers on the majority of his brethren the power to bind
him by a determination to adopt the alternative of accepting the
amendment rather than dissolving-that the making of such a
choice becomes a kind of corporate action, in which as in other
cases of corporate action, the majority have power to act on behalf of all. There is language in some of the cases which could
be adduced in support of such a view, and the majority of the
cases are so wholly without any clear cut theory that it may be
argued that they are as easy to reconcile with this theory as with
any other.
Nevertheless, it may be doubted whether a theory which
denies to the legislature any direct power over the minority
stockholder, and seeks to explain the ability which the legislature
undoubtedly has in fact to affect his rights on the basis of an
'It is equally out of accord with the language of the statutes and is,
furthermore, difficult to harmonize with substance of such statutes as impose
a penalty other than dissolution-a fine, for example-for failure to comply
with the provisions of the amendment.
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implied agreement by him to permit the majority to act for him,
is really satisfactory. There is in truth no such agreement. If
we imply it, it is only because we think it is sound policy that the
rule of majority control should be substituted for the rule of
unanimous consent. If the basis of the doctrine is policy, it is
preferable to hold that the power is in the legislature, which
controls policy, rather than that the power is in the majority
stockholders by virtue of a fictitious agreement between them
and the minority.
With the exception of a few opinions, of which that of
Judge Doe is the most carefully worked out, the cases, in general, tacitly assume and some of them expressly state that a
charter which is granted subject to the reserved power of amendment or repeal is a contractual transaction between the state and
the incorporators 47 within the broad meaning of the word "contract" as used in the Dartmouth College case.48

The theory

implicit in the majority of the decisions would seem to be that in
accepting the charter containing such a reservation, the incorporators impliedly agree that the legislature may amend the charter
contract with the state despite the fact that the incidental consequence of such an amendment is to alter the contract between the
members themselves by permitting the majority to continue to do
business under the charter as amended regardless of the wishes
of the minority.
It may be contended that it is beyond the legitimate scope
of legislative power for the legislature to enter into such an ar"The reserved power "is a provision intended to preserve to the state
control over its contract with the corporators," Tomlinson v. Jessup, I5
Wall. 454, 458 (1873). This statement is by Field, J., whose view of the
reserved power, as indicated by the quotation in note 32, supra, might easily
have led him to the conclusion that a charter which is subject to the reserved
power is not a contract at all. In Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 240
(igoo), a charter of a railroad, granted subject to the reserved power, provided for a tax on gross earnings in lieu of all property taxes. The state later
sought to impose a property tax in addition. The court held this invalid, saying that " a contractual exemption of the property of the railroad in whole,

upon consideration of a certain payment, cannot be changed by the state so
as to continue the obligation in full, and at the same time deny to the company, either in whole or in part, the exemption conferred by the contract."
This language assumes that such a charter is a contract, which the legislature

has a limited power to modify. See also Duluth & Iron Range R. Co. v. St.
Louis County, 179 U. S. 302 (I9OO).
•Supra note 17:
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rangement. The power of the legislature is to enact laws. This
power includes the power to confer either irrevocable or revocable franchises. It may plausibly be argued, however, that it
does not include the power to make agreements with the incorporators to the effect that if they receive a corporate franchise
they shall be deemed to agree that the legislature shall have power
to make laws with regard to their enterprise which it could not
make if there were no contract relation between them and the
49
legislature.
It is submitted that such an argument is unduly restrictive
of legislative power. It is doubtless true that the legislature
cannot by contract obtain anything but legislative power. It
could not, for example, contract for the power to act as judge
in controversies between stockholders. Legislative power under
our constitution is, however, normally subject to, certain restrictions which are not inherent in it but are due to specific limitations contained in the bill of rights. How far some of these
may be waived by the parties entitled thereto may be doubtful,
but there would seem to be little doubt that the effect of the due
process clause on legislation with regard to a particular property right would be radically affected by an agreement on the
part of the person having such right that it should not be deemed
to be protected against impairment by legislation enacted for
what the legislature regarded as the public good, and that the
effect of the contracts clause on a particular agreement would be
radically altered by the consent on the part of the parties to
such contract that it be subject to alteration by such legislation.50
. See Dow v. Northern R. R., supra note 28, and Opinion of the Justices,
66 N. H. 629 (8q9i).
"Certainly the legislature cannot in a charter of incorporation, or in any other law, reserve to itself any greater power of legislation than the constitution itself concedes to it"; Bradley, J., dissenting, in
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 748 (1878).
"In footnote 22 of the article by Horace Stern, supra note 32, the learned
author asks the question: "Can a power which does not exist be reserved?"
It is submitted that the question is rather: "Can a power which the legislature
does not ordinarily have be obtained by it by an agreement made as a condition
of receiving a privilege?" The answer to this question is neither an unqualified "yes" nor an unqualified "no." There are certain powers which are
so clearly non-legislative that no agreement by the parties to be affected thereby
can authorize the legislature to exercise them. There are constitutional rights
which cannot be waived, even by an agreement with the state to waive them.
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It is true that the legislature can according to modern decisions modify contracts under the police power. Nevertheless,
a reasonable legislature might feel that the public good demands
that, if it is to grant the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, it shall retain for itself a greater degree of freedom to modify the contract rights between the persons engaging
in such business than the contract clause, even as impliedly modified by the police power, would normally allow. It may fairly
be said that in getting the incorporators to agree to permit the
legislature such greater freedom with regard to modifying such
contracts, the legislature is contracting for the exercise of legislative power unhampered by the existence of what might otherwise be deemed vested rights, rather than contracting for the
exercise of power which is not legislative at all.
Whatever limitations there may be on the power of amendment, there would seem to be no doubt that, if the theory just
stated be adopted, it follows that, prima facie at least, the power
embraces all phases of the charter contract with the state. This
view necessarily leads to the consideration of the question of
what is meant by the charter contract and what is included
therein. As stated above, this so-called contract is in reality a
grant or license to carry on business in a way in which it could
not be carried on without incorporation. For constitutional
purposes we treat the legislature as contracting with the incorporators that the grant shall not be revoked or modified unless
power to do so is reserved, and thus treat the grant as in effect
Such, for example, is the right to resort to the federal courts where the
federal constitution grants such a right. Terral v. Burke Construction Co.,
257 U. S. 529 (1922).
On the other hand, there is no doubt that a state
which is granting to a foreign corporation permission to do business in
the state may exact from the corporation and from its stockholders an express or implied agreement to be bound by regulations which, apart from
its power of exclusion, the state would have no power to impose. See Thomas
v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 220 (1914), holding that a state may make it a
condition of the entry of a foreign corporation into the state that its stockholders consent to personal liability under the local laws and that such consent
will be implied when the stockholder expresses a wish that the corporation do
business in that state. Similarly, a state which is granting the privilege of
incorporation, may within limits discussed hereafter, exact from the stockholders an agreement that the legislature may have certain powers which it
would not possess in the absence of agreement.
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a contract between the legislature and the incorporators. Obviously, then,- the rights and'privileges granted to the incorporators which are of such a nature that the incorporators -would
not have possessed them-had they done business without incorporation are parts of,this, charter-grant or 'contract. These rights
include the privilege of isuing and being sued, and -of taking.and
conveying property in the name of the business -entity-ights
which; apart, from' recent statutes, could ;not be secured .without
incorporation. They also norrnally include the, privilege of doing business without personal-liability, and the power, by issuing
stock to -other, ptrsons besides the incorporators,- to confer similar privileges on such other- persons'and on their transferees;With the exceptioni of _ these rights, powers,- and privileges,
the stockholders of -a 'corporation generally acquire no rights
which they would not have as a matter of common law if they did
business without incorporation. All the so-called powers of a
corporation which relate' to the kind of business which it can do
are generally no broader, though they are' frequently narrower,
than the powers possessed by natural persons. Such being 'the
case, it has been argued that these powers- are no, part of the
corporate franchise or contract and are not subject to the amending power." The argument, however, finds little or no support
in the cases, and it is submitted that it is unsound. ..
Two views have been and still are taken as to the-nature
of corporate powers. One view, which has the support of- the
English and of some important American decisions, is that a
corporation obtains not only its life but every one of its powers
from the charter, and that it is incapable of doing anything not
authorized thereby.5 2 If this view, which is generally knowfi as
the "special capacity" doctrine, be accepted, it can scarcely be
denied- that, inasmuch as every power which the corporation
possesses is conferred upon it by the charter, the extent of its
powers is a portion of its franchise or charter contract.
"1See

53 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1, 44 (16o5).

- Central Transportation Co. -v. Pullman'Palace Car Co., "139, U. S. 24
(i8go) ; Ashbury Railway Carriage & Irori 'Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653

( 1875) . '

:

-

.._
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Of recent years, however, another theory, commonly
called the "general capacity" theory, has been gaining ground in
this country. According to this theory, a corporation once created has the legal power, as distinguished from the legal privilege, of doing not only those acts which are authorized by the
state, but those which are unauthorized, so that what is commonly called an ultra vires act is, nevertheless, a corporate act. 53
Thus, the powers do not depend upon the charter, except in the
sense that until brought into being by the charter the corporation
has no existence and no powers of any sort.
If this view be adopted, the argument that so-called corporate "powers" are not derived from the franchise or charter
contract is somewhat more plausible than it is if we accept the
special capacity theory. Nevertheless, it is submitted that, even
on this view, the argument that such "powers" are not part of
the charter contract is unsound in that it is immaterial for our
purposes whether the limitations which the charter imposes on
corporations are limitations on its powers or only limitations
on its privileges. Even according to the general capacity theory,
a corporation, if it insists on taking advantage of its legal powers
to do acts which it is not privileged to do, incurs a liability to
have its charter taken away from it, even though the charter may
be an irrevocable one. The limits of its privilege of acting, as
distinguished from its power to do so, are fixed by its charter,
and there seems to be no good reason to deny that these privileges are part of the charter contract. There is little or no discussion on this question in the cases, but the results reached
54
in them are in accordance with the view here taken.
George W. Pepper, Rights Under Unauthorized Corporate Contracts, 8
YALE L. J. 24 (1898); Albert J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corpora-

tion and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 35 YALE L. J. 13 (1925). See also Cornstock, C. J., in Bissell v. Mich. Sou. & Nor. Ind. R. R., 22 N. Y. 258, 266 (186o).
"Consciously, or unconsciously, all courts today do treat some unauthorized
corporate action as corporate action"; E. H. Warren, Executed Ultra Vires
Transactions, 23 HARV. L. REV. 495, 497 (1xo).
"The cases upholding amendments which restrict the ordinary powers
of a corporation, as distinct from its special franchises such as the right
of eminent domain or its members' freedom from personal liability, are numerous and the cases which uphold amendments imposing additional burdens
on the corporation are even more numerous. See, for example, New York

AMENDMENTS TO CORPORATE CHARTERS

A particular corporate charter-speaking now of true
charters conferred by a special act as distinguished from socalled charters of corporations created by the act of the incorporators themselves under general laws-in addition to conferring on the corporation the special privileges above referred
to and delimiting the purposes for which these privileges can be
made use of, also contains a number of provisions as to the internal organization of the corporation, regulating such matters
as the voting rights of the members, the number and powers of
the diredtors, the relative rights of the various classes of stockholders, and the like. These provisions seem rather to be conditions on which the corporate franchise may be exercised than
provisions of the corporate franchise itself. Nevertheless, as
such conditions, they should be regarded as parts of the charter
contract. That they are not necessarily in all cases beyond the
scope of the reserved power of amendment is shown by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of a majority
of the state courts. 55
It is submitted, therefore, that, where the corporation is
formed by special act, the charter contract with the state is one
of broad scope, embracing not only the privileges and immunities of the corporation but its internal organization; and that,
Ry. v. Bristol, 155 U. S. 556 (893); St. Louis Iron Mt. & St Paul Ry.
v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404 (1899); Fair Haven R. R. v. New Haven, 203 U. S.
379 (x9o6) ; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (i9o8) ; Opinion of. the
Justices, 97 Me. 590, 55 Ati. 828 (19o3); New York Central & H. R. R. v.
Williams, igg N. Y. ii6, 92 N. E. 404 (i9io). Some of these decisions might,
it is true, have been based upon the police power rather than on the reserved
power of amendment.
There are also many decisions upholding the amendment granting increased powers. Such amendments are, however, in general not compulsory but
confer a new power on the majority, if they choose to exercise it. The effect
of such amendments on the minority's rights is a disputed question which will
be discussed at a later point in this article.
"For compulsory amendments see Miller v. New York, is Wall.
478 (1873), increasing voting rights of city as stockholder; Jackson v. Walsh,
75 Md. 304, 23 Atl. 778 (1892), increasing number of trustees of college and
providing that certain of them be state officials. The acceptance of such amendments is more commonly made dependent on their acceptance by a majority
or some other percentage of the stockholders. For cases dealing with such
amendments, see infra notes 69 and 7o.
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subject to certain limitations to be discussed hereafter, all portions of this contract are subject to the amending power.5 6
Modern corporations are not, however, as a general rule,
incorporated by special legislative act, but by action of the incorporators taken in accordance with the provisions of a general
law. Although these general laws limit in some degree the privileges and purposes and form of organization which a corporation may have, much of the detail as to the scope of its activities
and as to its internal structure is regulated not by law but by the
agreement of the incorporators as embodied in the articles of
incorporation which they draw up. In many states where such
general laws exist, the constitution or statutes, instead of reserving the power to repeal or amend charters, reserve the power to
57
repeal or amend the corporation laws.
Suppose that in one of these states the corporation laws
say nothing about the number of directors and that the incorporators have fixed this number at five. If the legislature should
thereafter provide that all corporations, including those pre" It is suggested in a note in 7 CoL. L. Rsv. 598 (i9o7), that the contract
with the state, even if given the widest possible scope, does not include all the
provisions of the contract between the stockholders. Some of the distinctions
attempted to be made, as, for example, that a change in corporate powers
affects the contract with the state, but that an authorization of a consolidation
affects only the contract between the members, seem to the present writer
to be neither sound theoretically nor desirable practically. It is true, however,
that there are certain provisions of the charter which are intended purely for
the protection of the stockholders and could be waived by unanimous consent
without any alteration of the charter. Thus there would seem to be no doubt
that stockholders could, by unanimous consent, authorize an assessment on fully
paid stock. It may be argued with considerable plausibility that if the legislature purports to authorize such an assessment, it is attempting to change
the contract between the members rather than that between the corporation
and the state. Nevertheless, it is submitted that any such distinction is insubstantial. As is pointed out subsequently, the rule requiring unanimous
consent to amendments is a rule of corporation law and hence may fairly be
regarded as part of the charter contract with the state. An amendment doing
away with this rule as to a particular change is therefore an alteration of
the contract with the state without regard to the kind of change to which it
relates.
"See for example Kansas Const., Art. XII, § I; Michigan Const., Art.
XV, § i; Nebraska Const., Art. XIII, § i; New Jersey Const., Art. IV, § 7,
par. I i; New York Const., Art. VIII, § i. On the other hand, some states
and constitutions still speak of amending or repealing corporate charters rather
than corporation laws. See Pennsylvania Const., Art. XVI, § io; Rhode Island
Gen. Laws (923) ch. 248, § 79. Others give the legislature power to amend
or repeal both charters and corporations laws. See New Hampshire Pub.
Laws (1926) ch. 225, § 74.
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viously formed, shall have seven directors, the act would doubtless be an amendment to the corporation laws, and, unless invalid
for reasons hereafter to be dealt with, would be within the
power of amendment which had been reserved. It is not equally
clear that a special act providing that the corporation in question should have seven directors would be authorized by the
power which had been reserved of amending not the articles of,
particular corporations but the general corporation laws.
The problem is not, however, of much practical importance.
Many modern legislatures are, as we have seen, forbidden by
the constitutions of their states either to create corporations or
to amend their charters except by general laws, and, even where
no such constitutional provision exists, a legislature would be
unlikely to pass special acts regulating the internal affairs of a
particular corporation which had been organized under the general laws. The question is referred to here chiefly because it
illustrates the point that the conception of a corporate charter
as a contract with the legislature and of subsequent legislative
acts as modifications of that contract is an idea which does not
altogether fit the present system of organizing corporations
under general laws. The view of a charter as a contract has,
however, been carried over from the special act situation to that
in which incorporation is obtained through compliance with
general laws. We must accordingly deal with it as an established doctrine and endeavor to work out some satisfactory rule
for determining its scope.
Apart from this possibility of distinguishing between
amendments to the charter and amendment of the laws in cases
of incorporation under general laws, how far, if at all, does our
doctrine of the broad scope of the charter contract and of. the
amending power leave room for any limitations on the latter
power? We have seen that the corporation cannot lawfully do
any act not authorized by its charter, so that all of its privileges
are properly regarded as portions of that charter. In exercising
such privileges, the corporation will, however, obtain rights
which, although obtained through the exercise of powers conferred by the legislature, are not themselves derived from the
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charter contract but from dealings with private individuals. Of
such a nature, for example, is the tangible property of the corporation, which is derived either from subscriptions to its stock
or from purchases made by the corporation from outsiders. If
the legislature were to repeal the corporate charter, it is well
settled that, under modern rules of corporation law, this property would not escheat to the state, but would, after payment of
debts, be distributed among the stockholders. It is reasonable
and just, therefore, to hold, as the courts have held, that the
corporation and its stockholders cannot be deprived of such property by any action taken under the guise of amending the
charter.5 s
The decisions are not, however, entirely harmonious in the
reasons that they give for so holding. It has sometimes been
suggested that to use the amending power for the purpose of depriving the corporation of its property would be unconstitutional
as amounting to a taking without due process of law.69 Provided, however, that the reserved power of amendment is, as a
matter of construction, plainly broad enough to cover the taking of the corporation's property, this argument as to the applicability of the due process clause is a little difficult to maintain.
It is doubtless true that the legislature cannot obtain by contract
the right to pass laws which are plainly confiscatory, but there
may well be cases where corporate rights which would normally
be regarded as vested are not vested because the corporation has
agreed that they shall not be so treated. Where such is the case,
Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray 239 (Mass. 1859), is the leading

case for this proposition. See also Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v.
Superior, 263 U. S. 125 (1923). The decision in Holyoke Water Power Co.
v. Lyman, I5 Wall. 5oo (1873) is opposed to that in Commonwealth
v. Essex Co., supra, but the difference in decision appears to be due to a different view of the facts rather than of the scope of the reserved power. "It may
be admitted that it (the reserved power) cannot be exercised to take away
or destroy rights acquired by virtue of such a charter and which by a legitimate
use of the powers granted have become vested in the corporation." Miller
v. New York, 15 Wall. 478, 498 (1873).
" "The state cannot impose the condition that they (corporations) . . .
shall ask no indemnity if their lands be seized for public use, or be taken
without due process of law"; Field, J., in County of San Mateo v. So. Pac.
R. R. Co., 13 Fed. 722, 754 (1882). See also Lake Shore & Mich. Sou. R. R. v.
Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 698 (1899); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Wisconsin,
238 U. S. 491, 501 (1915).
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depriving the corporation of such rights would not be confiscation.6 0
It is submitted, therefore, that the real question in every
case is as to what the reserved power should, in the light of its
purposes and of our general notions of what is fair and reasonable, be construed to mean. So interpreted, it should, if couched
merely in the general language ordinarily used, not be construed
as including the right to take property not acquired from the
state, and, accordingly, that property would still be protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. If, on the other hand, the legislature should by express language reserve the right to take such
property for public purposes 61 without compensation, it is difficult to see how any constitutional rights could be infringed by
such a taking.
In addition to the vested rights of the corporation in its
property, which thus cannot be taken under the amending
power,6 2 the cases tell us that the stockholders also have vested
rights which cannot be so taken. Here again, it is submitted that
the basis for the limitation should be the proposition that the
amending power ought in the interests of fairness not to be construed as including the power to take away these rights, rather
than that it could not constitutionally be so construed.
' In Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. Superior, supra note 58 at 136,
the Supreme Court held that the reserved power does not authorize a legislature to deprive a corporation of a franchise which it had obtained from a
city. In so holding the court emphasized the fact that none of 'the decisions of
the state court prior to the date when the franchise was accepted "construes
the reservation in the state constitution as having the extraordinary scope
accorded to it below." The natural inference from this language is that if the
earlier decisions of the state court had been the other way, the franchise
would have been revocable despite the fact that it contained no language
making it so.
'A taking for private purposes would not be within the scope of legislative power. Hence it would be immaterial whether the corporation had agreed
to it or not.
'Rights obtained from third parties are not the only rights which the
courts have regarded as vested. There are also implied limitations on the
power of the legislature, under guise of amending the charter, to deprive the
corporation of rights obtained from the legislature itself or to impose on the
corporation unreasonable restrictions on its business freedom. Duluth & Iron
Range R. R. v. St. Louis County, supra note 47; Lake Shore & Mich. Sou.
R. R. Co. v. Smith, supra note 59; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Wisconsin,
supra note 59.
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Just what these vested rights are is not wholly clear. Stock
is created under authority of the charter so that the charter is
the origin of all of the stockholder's rights. In addition to that,
many of his specific rights, such as his right to vote, are usually
set forth in the charter or in the corporation laws, which are
regarded as integral parts of the charters of corporations formed
under general laws. The stockholder does not, however, obtain
his stock by grant from the state but by subscription to the capital of the corporation or by purchase. His stock is property
which has been duly paid for, and so to amend the charter as
wholly or in large measure to deprive his property of its value
is certainly unjust, at any rate where the amending power has
been reserved in general terms which the ordinary stockholder
would not regard as indicating an intent on the part of the legis-"
63
lature to reserve the right to destroy the value of his property.
It would likewise strike most of us as unjust to construe
the amending power in such a way as to enable the legislature to
change the nature of the corporate business so radically that the
stockholders would find themselves embarked in a radically different enterprise from that in which they originally invested
their money. No one buying stock in a railroad corporation
would, even if aware of the fact that the company's charter was
subject to amendment, imagine that the legislature might later
transform the business of his company into that of gold mining
or candy making. 4 In fairness to the stockholders, therefore,
the amending power should be construed so as to permit only
such amendments as are, in the language of the Supreme Court,
"consistent with the scope and object of the act of incorporation." 65
'Most of the cases deal with amendments which require the assent of the
majority of the stockholders in order to be effective. For such a case see
Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, I94 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443 (9o9),
in which the court, while upholding the amendment in question, recognized the
limits of the amending power where property rights of the stockholders are
involved.
" Here again the amendments which have been the subject of litigation
have required the consent of the majority for their adoption. The actual cases
do not involve such radical changes as those suggested. But see the consolidation cases cited in notes 95 and 96, infra.
"Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 324 (1877).
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It may be, however, that, as suggested later, the amending
power ought to be given a broader construction in this connection in cases where the majority stockholders as well as the legislature desire to change the business and the majority are willing
or can be compelled to purchase the stock of dissenters at its fair
value.
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.
Nebraska.
of
University
(To be concluded in the June issue.)

